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Este artículo estudia la provisión de inputs públicos en un país federal. 
También se consideran las consecuencias de una externalidad fiscal vertical. 
Con este fin se construye un modelo simple de equilibrio general que servirá 
para analizar la eficiencia de los equilibrios que se alcanzan bajo distintos 
escenarios. Los resultados muestran que la provisión estatal de inputs 
públicos puede afectar de un modo ambiguo a los ingresos tributarios del 
gobierno federal. El signo de este efecto dependerá, entre otras cosas, de la 
externalidad fiscal vertical. Además, se demuestra que alcanzar una 
asignación de second best no es inmediato para un gobierno federal, aun 
cuando éste se comporte como un líder Stackelberg. 
 





This paper studies the provision of public inputs in a federal system. A 
vertical tax externality is also considered. A simple general equilibrium 
model is used to analyze the efficiency of the equilibria under different 
scenarios. The results show that the state provision of public inputs may 
affect ambiguously federal tax revenues, depending on vertical tax 
externality, among others things. Moreover, it is proved that achieving a 
second best allocation is not straightforward for a federal government that 
plays a Stackelberg leader. 
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Traditionally, the study of vertical externalities in a federation has been lim-
ited to tax externalities, where diﬀerent levels of government share the same
tax base. Two very intuitive results are to be expected when taxes levied by
one level of government (federal, for instance) have eﬀects on the behaviour
of other levels of government (states). Firstly, if federal government increases
its tax rate, state governments face smaller tax bases, and will raise their tax
rates in order to hold their revenues constant; this is caused by a bigger val-
uation of the state provision of public goods when tax revenues have been
previously reduced. Secondly, as a consequence of the increment in the fed-
eral tax, state governments will see how their new (and smaller) tax bases are
less sensitive to the state taxes; the welfare loss derived from state taxation
lowers, and that will encourage increases in state taxes. As a result of this,
both governments will underestimate the true cost of the public funds they
use to ﬁnance public goods, and consequently there will exist an excessive
taxation on the same tax base.
Flowers (1988) deals with this issue through a Leviathan’s approach and
shows how the federation may be placed on the downward-sloping part of
the Laﬀer curve. Papers such as Dahlby and Wilson (1994), Boadway and
Keen (1996), and Sato (2000) ﬁnd similar conclusions when a benevolent
government is involved1. Moreover, these contributions propose diﬀerent
systems of vertical transfers that allow to correct the externalities between
governments.
Vertical externalities also arise when income redistribution is considered.
Johnson (1988) is concerned with the redistribution policy of the state gov-
ernments, and detects that they receive incentives to go beyond the optimal
redistribution. Boadway at al. (1998) use a model with heterogeneous and
partially-mobile agents to make explicit the trend of the states to be too
progressive; also the possibility of removing the vertical externality with in-
tergovernmental grants is taken into consideration.
An issue where the main branch of this literature has not paid much
attention is the vertical externality coming from the provision of public in-
puts. This point refers to the positive or negative eﬀects that the productive
public spending done by a government may exert on the decisions taken by
1However, Keen (1998) discusses that the eﬀects of federal taxes on state taxes are not
so much straightforward as it might seem. In fact, under not very restricted assumptions,
one can admit that an increase in the federal tax rate may reduce the state tax rate.
1other levels of government. Dalhby (1996) describes the eﬀects from expen-
diture externalities in a federation and deﬁnes the general framework for
matching expenditure grants to eliminate the externality. Recently, Dal-
hby and Wilson (2003) examine a model where state governments provide a
productivity-enhancing public input; they conclude that this externality may
have an ambiguous impact on federal revenues, and a matching grant from
the federal government to the states is able to correct the externality.
This paper uses Boadway and Keen’s (1996) model to study the eﬃciency
of the equilibria when a public input is provided by a state government. As
Dalhby and Wilson (2003), a positive impact of public input on wage rate
is considered here. Federal and state governments will use per unit taxes on
labor, instead of ad valorem taxes used by Dahlby and Wilson; this allows us
to focus on the likely positive externality derived from the public input, rather
than other positive vertical externalities that may arise when ad valorem
taxes are involved. The behaviour of the governments has been modelled
under diﬀerent scenarios: as a central government in an unitary country,
governments as Nash competitors, and one level of government acting as a
Stackelberg leader while the other level plays Nash.
The results show that, as Dahlby and Wilson (2003) point out, the
marginal cost of providing a public input may be under or overestimated
in a federal system. However, contrary to Dahlby and Wilson (2003), our
paper ﬁnds a bias between the unitary and federal solution which is not in-
dependent of the vertical tax externality. Other point which we focus on
is that a distinction between the marginal cost of the public funds and the
marginal cost of providing the public input is done. Moreover, since no ver-
tical transfers are available in our model, it is not straightforward the ability
of federal government behaving as a Stackelberg leader to achieve a second
best outcome. This paper demostrates that when the set of policy instru-
ments is restricted, the eﬀectiveness of the federal tax rate to implement a
second best optimum depends on the state governments’ reaction to changes
in federal taxes.
The estructure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main
features of the model. Section 3 provides the second best outcome achieved
in an unitary country. Next section compares these results to those reached
when federal and state governments play Nash. Section 5 studies whether a
federal government that behaves as a Stackelberg leader is able to replicate
the second best allocation. Finally, section 6 concludes.
22T h e m o d e l
Let a federal country be which consists of k identical states. It will allows us
to address symmetric allocations and to eliminate the possibility of horizontal
grants used for redistribution aims. Due to this simmetry we will focus our
discussion on the bilateral relations between the federal government and only
one state government. Each state is populated by n identical households that
are assumed to be completely inmobile. Household’s utility function is given
by the separable form:
u(x,l)+B (G), (1)
where x is a private good used as numeraire, l is labor supplied and G is a
pure public good provided by the federal government. The properties of the
function u(x,l) are the standard ones and B (G) is increasing and concave.
The representative household faces the following budget constraint:
x =( ω − τ)l, (2)
where ω i st h ew a g er a t ea n dτ the per unit tax on labor. Household’s
optimization problem consists of maximizing (1) subject to (2) to yield labor
supply l(ω − τ) and indirect utility function V (ω − τ)+B (G). It is assumed
that l
0 > 02.
Output in the economy is produced using labor services and a public
input g according to the following aggregate production function:
F (L,g), (3)
where L = nl.T h i s f u n c t i o n s a t i s ﬁes the usual assumptions: increasing in
its arguments and strictly concave, that is, positive but decreasing marginal
productivity of production factors. Output can be used costlessly as x,G or
g. Labor market is perfectly competitive so the wage rate is linked to the
marginal productivity of the labor:
ω = FL [nl(ω − τ),g] (4)
This allows us to achieve a wage function such as w(g,τ,n). Some results of
comparative statics can be found now; they will be used later:
2Hereafter, diﬀerentiation is denoted by a prime for functions of a single variable, while









0 > 0 (6)
The economic proﬁt generated in each state is equal to:
π(g,τ,n)=F [nl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ),g] − nl[ω(g,τ,n) − τ]FL [nl(ω − τ),g]
(7)
Again, it is useful to obtain some results for later use:






nl ≶ 0 (8)




Note that the eﬀect of public input on rents is ambiguous because g increases
output (and hence, the economic proﬁts) but this type of productive public
expenditure exerts a positive impact upon wage rate, reducing rents. The
sign of equation (8) will become relevant to obtain future results of the model.
Each level of government sets its own tax rates on labor. Denoting T as
the tax rate established by the federal government while t is the corresponding
variable at the state level, it can be written τ = T + t. Thus the revenue
raised by the federal government to ﬁnance G is:
G(T,t,θ,g,n)=knTl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+kθπ(g,τ,n) (10)
where 0 <θ<1 is the proportional tax rate on proﬁts levied by the federal
government. Throughout this paper, θ is assumed to be ﬁxed and exoge-
nously determined. The eﬀects of changes in T,t and g on federal budget
constraint are given by:
GT =( ωτ − 1)knTl
0
+ knl + kθπτ (11)
Gt =( ωτ − 1)knTl
0
+ kθπτ = GT − knl (12)
Gg = knTl
0
ωg + kθπg (13)
4The state revenue constraint is
g(t,T,θ,n)=ntl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+( 1− θ)π(g,τ,n) (14)
Note that all economic proﬁt is taxed away by both levels of governments
because it is an eﬃcient source of resources for the public sector3.F o rf u t u r e
reference, the impacts of changes in t and T are obtained:
gt =( ωτ − 1)ntl
0
+ nl +( 1− θ)πτ (15)
gT =( ωτ − 1)ntl
0
+( 1− θ)πτ = gt − nl (16)
When one of the equations (12), (13) or (16) is diﬀerent to zero a vertical
externality arises. Equations (12)-(13) show how federal government’s tax
revenues are aﬀected by ﬁscal decisions taken on the tax rate and the provi-
sion of the public input by the state government, while equation (16) is the
eﬀect of the federal tax on labor upon state government’s revenues.
3 T h es e c o n d - b e s ta l l o c a t i o ni na nu n i t a r y
country
Characterizing a vertical externality requires to consider the diﬀerences be-
tween the optimal solution in an unitary country and the solution achieved
when several levels of governments exist. Moreover, the use of distorting
taxes such as a per unit tax on labor leads to second best allocations even
when only a central government is taken into consideration. Since lump-sum
taxes are not available for government, this second best scenario always will
be our reference framework. In this section, we obtain the ﬁrst order condi-
tions for the optimal provision of the national public good G and the public
input g in a unitary country.
3We establish here that the country is under-populated in order to avoid that a tax on
rents may suﬃce to ﬁnance a ﬁrst-best level of public good (Wildasin, 1986; Boadway and
Keen, 1996).
5The central government chooses the values of G,g and τ to maximize
the representative household’s utility subject to an aggregated budget con-
straint4. Formally,
Max V (ω − τ)+B (G)
s.t. : G + kg = knτl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+kπ(g,τ,n),( 1 7 )
where τ = T + t. First order conditions for G,g and τ are as follows:
B
0
(G) − µ =0 (18)
V
0
ωg − µk + µknτl
0
ωg + µkπg =0 (19)
(ωτ − 1)V
0
+ µknl + µ(ωτ − 1)knτl
0
+ µkπτ =0 , (20)
where µ is the Lagrange’s multiplier. Combining (18) with (20), using Roy’s
identity and the expressions (6) and (9), yields the necessary condition for










where λ is the private marginal utility of income. LHS of equation (21)
shows the sum of marginal beneﬁts received by all households that live in
the federation. RHS of equation (21) is the marginal cost of providing G;
this cost is bigger than one due to using distorting taxes as instrument to
ﬁnance the national public good. As is well-known, this expression is the
Samuelson’s rule for public good provision corrected by Atkinson and Stern
(1974).
After some manipulation with equations (19) and (20), using again Roy’s
identity, and (6) and (9), the second best condition for the optimal provision















In essence, the interpretation of this equation is the same than before for
G. However, it may be worth noting that two terms can be distinguished in
4Wildasin (1986) demonstrates that it is relevant to distinguish between to maximize
the per capita utility or the total utility.
6the RHS. The ﬁrst one is the marginal cost of the public funds (MCPF);
the second one is the tax revenue eﬀect that arises so long as g may aﬀect
positively or negatively the tax base through economic proﬁt and wage rate.
Both terms of the RHS deﬁne the marginal provision cost of providing a
public input (MPC). Whereas in the case of a consumption public good
the MCPF and the MPC are equal, when a public input is considered a
distinction is required. Comparing expressions (21) and (22) a simple result
is obtained:
Proposition 1 If central government in an unitary country sets a tax rate
τ>0 and πg 1 0, then the marginal cost of providing G will be higher than
that corresponding for g (Suﬃcient condition).
Notice that the provision of g has a positive impact on tax bases and this
reduces the marginal cost of providing public inputs, even with distorting
taxes. Regardless of this, nothing can be said about the provided levels of G
and g. If Roy’s identity is used in the LHS, and expressions (5) and (8) are
inserted in (22), manipulation gives:
Fg =1 ,( 2 3 )
that is, the production eﬃciency condition for the provision of public inputs
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). This means that the production eﬀects of the
public input are equal to its marginal production cost, though distortionary
(but optimally set) taxation is used. At this point, this model does not
appart from results obtained by Feehan and Matsumoto (2002), and Dahlby
and Wilson (2003).
4 Vertical externalities when federal and state
government play Nash
Now we are interested in comparing the equilibrium achieved in an unitary
country to those could be reached when a federal system exists. The existence
of diﬀerent levels of government may alter the behaviour of the agents if they
share the same tax base and/or, for instance, the public spending done by
the state government is able to modify the federal budget constraint, and
7vice versa. Both cases are taken into consideration in this article, althogh we
focus on the vertical externalities from public spending.
This section deals with the optimal conditions involved when state and
federal governments behave as Nash competitors, that is, each government
takes as given the tax rates and the level of public expenditures implemented
by the other governments. Hence, state’s optimization problem consists of
selecting the values for g and t to maximize the per capita utility of the state,
taken its own budget constraint into account. In other words,
Max V (ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+B (G)
s.t. : g = ntl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+( 1− θ)π(g,τ,n) (24)
First order conditions we obtain are:
V
0
ωg − µ + µntl
0
ωg + µ(1 − θ)πg =0 (25)
(ωτ − 1)V
0
+ µnl + µ(ωτ − 1)ntl
0
+ µ(1 − θ)πτ =0 , (26)
The expression that relates the marginal beneﬁts and costs of providing a













ωg − (1 − θ)πg
´
(27)
Again, the RHS of equation (27) shows the marginal cost of public in-
put provision when distorting taxes are used and diﬀerent eﬀects on state
revenues are involved. As above, both an expression for the MCPF and
at a xr e v e n u ee ﬀect appear. At this point, a key question arises about the
optimality of this results when comparing with the Second Best outcome
(equation (22)). Dahlby and Wilson (2003) ﬁnd that a vertical externality
appears from the provision of a productivity-enhancing public good, and this
may exert a positive or negative eﬀect on federal tax revenues; also they state
that the under or over-provision of public inputs derived from this externality
is independent of the sign and magnitude of the tax externality. Our aim
here is giving more details about this issue, and the model allows us to yield
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If T ≥ 0,t h eM C P Fo fﬁnancing a public input by state
governments that play Nash is smaller than the MCPF of the public input
8provision in an unitary country. The marginal cost of providing g perceived
by state governments may be higher, equal or smaller than in an unitary
country.
Proof. Using τ = T +t, an alternative expression of the RHS of the equation
















First term is the MCPF. By assumption, FLL < 0 so that denominator is
bigger than that in the expression (22). Regarding the marginal provision
cost, nothing can be said about the magnitude of the second term in relation
to (22). Note that by (8), πg may have either sign.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition establishes a parallel between a consump-
tion public good and a public input; when a vertical tax externality exists,
the MCPF for providing both kinds of public expenditures are perceived as
lower by the state governments. The second part of the proposition pays at-
tention upon the MCP and claims that the sign of the expenditure vertical
externality is not determined, so that the state government may under or







S be, that is, the ratio between the MCP in an unitary
country and the MCP perceived by the state governments (the RHS of
equations (22) and (28), respectively). Proposition 2 states that ψ ≷ 1,
i. e., the state government may provide a sub-optimal level of public input
when ψ<1, and otherwise. About the value of ψ some results can be
established:
Proposition 3 i) ψ is decreasing in the elasticity of the wage rate to g if
T>0
ii) ψ is decreasing in the marginal productivity of g.
iii) ψ is increasing in the share of rents levied by the federal government
θ when πg 0 0
iv) ψ is increasing in the elasticity of the labor supply to the federal tax
rate T (in absolut value).
Proof. i) Using the terms with ωg in the second term of (28) and the
expression (8) for πg, yields nTl
0ωg +θnlFLLl
0ωg. Rearranging we can write
that (T − θlFLL)nl
0ωg > 0 given (5), T>0 (by assumption) and FLL < 0.
9ii) Using expression (8) and 0 <θ<1,a ni n c r e a s ei nFg reduces the
second term of (28). But this eﬀect is bigger in the case of numerator of
(22), hence ψ decreases.


















¶2 .S i n c eb o t ht e r m so ft h eR H So f
(27) are positive, then FLL < 0 and πg 0 0 make negative the later derivative.
Thus MCP
g
S is decreasing in θ,a n dψ is increasing in θ.
iv) In the denominator of the MCPF in expression (28), the term Tl
0
l can
be interpreted as the elasticity of the labor supply to the federal tax rate T
(in absolut value).
These results lead to qualify the Dahlby and Wilson’s (2003) statement
that tax externalities do not aﬀect public spending externalities in a federal





U depends on the tax rate set by the federal government or
whether labor supply is sensitive to the federal tax rate. This means that
both externalities are interrelated.
Federal government may also behave as a Nash competitor but the re-
sults would be the same. The only diﬀerence is that the ﬁrst order condition
for G would not include terms in the numerator of the RHS to take into
consideration the revenue eﬀects existing when public input5.A n y w a y ,t h e
behaviour characterizing federal government usually follows the assumptions
of the Stackelberg leader instead of Nash competitor. In that case, the role
of the federal government appears as a relevant key for solving vertical ex-
ternalities.
5 Federal government plays as Stackelberg
leader
In this section we study which consequences would have on the eﬃciency of
the equilibrium if the federal government behaves as a Stackelberg leader,
anticipating the eﬀects of its actions on the states’ decisions. Traditionally,
this has been the usual way to correct the vertical externality. Federal gov-
5See the appendix for details.
10ernment sets a tax rate taken as given the behaviour of the states, and is
able to replicate the second best outcome achieved by the government in
an unitary country. However, the success of this policy is very sensitive to
whether federal government has unrestricted access to vertical transfers or
not. As Keen (1998) points out, if vertical transfers are not available for fed-
eral government, to achieve a second best allocation is not straightforward,
even when the federal government knows the states’ reaction function.
Our aim here is to shed some light about the capacity of federal govern-
ment to get a second best outcome when a public input is provided. Vertical
transfers will not be allowed for the federal government, whose only instru-
ment to aﬀect the behaviour of the states will be the tax rate T.T h i s
approach seeks to show not only how the conclusions of the main branch of
literature may be modiﬁed when policy instruments are restricted, but also
under which assumptions a federal system with no vertical transfers is able
to achieve a second best allocation. This scenario permits dealing with real
cases, where the intergovernmental grants are not designed to correct vertical
externalities.
A ﬁrst point that is worth noting is to question if there exists a federal
tax rate that solves the vertical externality. Following Boadway and Keen
(1996), one can think exclusively in terms of tax revenues and deﬁne the
marginal vertical externality as follows:
γ = Gt + Gg,( 2 9 )
that is, considering the negative and/or positive eﬀects generated by the
states through tax rates and the provision of public inputs. As at an optimum
γ =0 , inserting (12) and (13) in (29), and solving for T the optimal federal




(ωτ + ωg − 1)l
0n
≶ 0 (30)
Since there are no vertical transfers between levels of government, only
one instrument such as T should oﬀset the opposite eﬀects that states’ deci-
sions have on federal revenues. Firstly, state tax rates may exert a negative
impact on federal budget constraint; as pointed out by Boadway and Keen
(1996), in that case federal government ought to subsidy the common tax
base that, as a consequence of the tax externality, is over-exploited; thus, a
negative federal tax rate could be justiﬁed. But secondly, it is also likely that
11the provision of public inputs increases the federal revenues; thus if t follows
T, it may be convenient that a positive federal tax rate is implemented to
encourage state taxes. Such tax policy will get resources for the supply of
public inputs. Note that in accordance with Proposition 3 (iv), the MCP
g
S
is decreasing in Tl
0
l (ψ is increasing in Tl
0
l ), so T may stimulate the spending
in g.
A key question here is to know what is the state’s reaction function with
respect to the federal tax rate. This allows us to deepen in explaining the
eﬀects of federal tax policy on the eﬃciency of multi-governments system.
As the ﬁrst order condition for the state’s problem can be written as follows
V
0
ωggt +( ωτ − 1)V
0
=0 ,( 3 1 )
diﬀerentiating this expression respect T we obtain:














ωττ (1 + tT)=0
As gtT = gtt +( ωτ − 1)l
0n, rearranging terms and solving for tT,t h ea b o v e













Given the assumptions of our model, nothing can be said about the sign of
tT (tT ≶ 0). In other words, state tax rates may react to changes in the
federal tax rate ambiguously. This result breaks one of the most extended
statement in the literature about vertical externalities, namely: an increase
in tax rates carried out by one level of government causes an increment in
taxes levied by other governments that share the same tax base. However,
papers as Kotsogianis (1998) or Keen (1998) ﬁnd relevant exceptions of this
assertion, supporting the result we obtain here.
Even regarding a more general view, the doubts about the eﬀects of
changes in federal taxes on the tax estructure of the federation remain. The
sign of 1+ tT continues being indeterminate. And since 1+ tT is equal to dτ
dT ,
one is not able to say what will happen with the national tax rate on labor
when the federal tax is modiﬁed. Conversely, Boadway and Keen (1996) ﬁnd
12a clear result at this point: 1+ tT > 0, that is, although the state tax rate
may descend after an increase in the federal tax rate, this fall will not oﬀset
the rise of the federal tax, so the national tax rate τ will be bigger.
Our model does not provide an unambiguous result here, what means
1+ tT ≶ 0.W e ﬁnd that the state tax rate may decrease by so much to
overshoot an increase in T, and vice versa. How can we explain this result?
Some intuition about that is provided by Keen (1998). Assume that labor
supply is rather ineslastic. A ﬁrst sight would tell us that, ceteris paribus,
the magnitude of the tax vertical externality would be smaller than if an
inelastic tax base is levied. But the assumption of ceteris paribus is not a good
simpliﬁcation here. As is well known, Ramsey rule sets that the lower the
elasticity (in absolut value), the greater the optimal federal (and state) tax
rate is likely to be. When the tax base is occupated by more than one level of
government, the welfare loss from the tax externality is greater when inelastic
tax bases are used. This may lead to place the economy on the downward-
sloping part of the Laﬀer curve. At this point, the state government may
react to an increase in T reducing t in a bigger proportion because this
strategy is welfare-enhancing and permits to raise the tax revenues.
The diﬀerence between our model and Boadway and Keen’s (1996) one is
based on the vertical expenditure externality that exists in the former. By (8)
and (13), the public input g may aﬀect federal budget constraint negatively
or positively. If a negative impact is to be expected, federal government
probably sets a bigger tax rate T in order to compensate the fall in its tax
revenues. Hence, the probability to be on the downward-sloping part of the
Laﬀer curve may be greater with an expenditure externality.
Now we have enough information to address whether a Stackelberg frame-
work is able to achieve a second-best outcome. The federal’s optimization
problem we have to solve is the following:
Max V (ω(g(t,T,θ),τ,n) − τ)+B (G(T,t,θ,g(t,T,θ)))
s.t. : t = t(T,θ) (33)
As can be seen, both objetive function and federal constraint take into con-
sideration the behaviour of the states and the inﬂuence of federal decisions
on them. Hence, federal government chooses T regarding the ﬁrst order con-
ditions obtained for state government. Formally, the next expression comes
from (33):




[GT + GttT + GggT]=0 (34)























,( 3 5 )
where (11) and (16) have been used. Expression (35) relates the MCP at
federal level (MCPG
F )t ot h eMCP at state level (MCP
g
S) when the former
behaves as Stackelberg leader and later as Nash competitor. Note that if tax
bases are not shared and the provision of public inputs is done by a central













,( 3 6 )
that is, the relation between the MCP of producing G and g at second best
optimum.
Given these two alternative relations between the MCP0s under diﬀerent
scenarios, a discussion can be initiated about if a federal government that












U refers to the identical concept but in an unitary country. These
two ratios are positive, but the relevant issue here is to know what extent
they are respect to 1; this allows us to say whether the MCPG is bigger
than the MCPg or not under several assumptions, and consequently if the
federal structure of the country leads to an under or overprovision of the
public input. Some results can be obtained about this.
Proposition 4 If T,t 1 0 and the federal government behaves as a Nash
competitor, the MCPG
U will be higher than the MCPG
F . Hence, a bigger level
of the national public good G is expected to be provided in a federal than in
an unitary country.
Proof. See Appendix.
This is a standard result of the literature on vertical tax externalities.
Usually, it is proved for the state’s solution but here we have shown that it
obviously happens the same for a Nash federal government.
14Proposition 5 If federal government plays as Stackelberg leader (with T∗ >
0)a n dπg 1 0,t h e nη ≶ 1.H e n c e ,MCPG




Proof. Using (16) and rearranging terms, the expression in parenthesis in




knl [Gg +( 1+tT)Gt]
(37)
By (6) and (9) gT < 0;i fπg 1 0 then Gg > 0 when T∗ > 0,a n dGt < 0 by
(9), ∀T∗ > 0.A s 1+ tT ≶ 0, we are not sure if the denominator of (37) is
higher, equal or smaller than 1. So η ≶ 1.
Proposition 5 questions the ability of the federal government to achieve
a second best optimum with no vertical transfers. Notice that in an unitary
country, also with τ>0 and πg 1 0,t h eMCP of G is higher than the MCP
of g unambiguously. From proposition 5 a necessary condition to ensure this
must be established:
Corollary 1 to Proposition 5 Federal government that plays as Stack-
elberg may achieve a second best outcome if, and only if, 1+ tT 6 0.
An explanation for this can be drawn. When vertical transfers are avail-
able, they generally are used to discourage the over-taxation of the tax base
by the state government. When the federal government cannot employ this
policy instrument, a situation where 1+ tT > 0 d o e sn o tm a k eu ss u r et h a t
the state government reduces the increment in τ when T is increased. The
likely of an over taxation on labor is not avoided when τ raises with T.S o
the federal government is unable to place the economy at the second best
optimum, even if it behaves as Stackelberg leader. As one can see, the key
point in our model to prevent the vertical externalities is the states’ reaction
function.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Sharing tax instruments between federal and state governments is a common
feature in federations. It allows that both levels of government to be implied
in ﬁnancing their public expenditures, and to get gains in eﬃciency due to
the stronger link between the beneﬁts and costs of the provision of public
goods. However, the concurrency of tax power on the same tax base causes
15tax vertical externalities appear, and a deviation of the results from the
second best allocation is produced.
Another possibility of vertical externality arises when the public spending
provided by a level of government aﬀects other government’s decisions. This
is the case, for instance, of public inputs such as public investment, education
and so on, that may exert diﬀerent impacts on the tax revenues belonging to
other governments. This second vertical externality has received very little
a t t e n t i o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r eo nﬁscal federalism, though it may be found in
countries as United States, Australia or Spain.
This paper presents a model in which federal and state governments set
a per unit tax on labor to ﬁnance two kinds of public expenditures. Federal
government provides a consumption public good, while state governments
a productivity-enhancing public input. A second best allocation is reached
because of using distorting taxes; and this outcome will become our reference
scenario. When a Nash behaviour is to be assumed for the governments, a
vertical externality arises from the provision of public inputs, as well as the
tax externality. While the former exerts an ambiguous eﬀect on the federal
tax revenues, the later presents a negative inﬂuence. In this model, the
sign and extent of the expenditure externality depend on the tax externality.
Moreover, our results allows us to distinguish between the cost of the public
funds and the provision cost of public input.
Also the ability of the federal government to achieve the second best out-
come is studied. Our approach restricts the policy instruments of the federal
government, thus vertical transfers are not available. Contrary to previous
literature, the model here described cannot assure that a federal government
that plays as a Stackelberg leader may attain the second best result. We
only will have some guarantees about that when the states’ reaction function
implies that an increase in the federal tax rate is followed by a decrease in
t h es t a t et a xr a t et ob ee n o u g ht oo v e r s h o o tt h ec h a n g ei nt h ef e d e r a lt a x
rate.
A further research on this topics can be initiated along diﬀerent directions.
One interesting point would come from introducing mobility in the house-
holds. It would aﬀect the eﬃciency of the equilibria; particularly, horizontal
externalities would arise and the set of policy instruments probably should
be enlarged to consider transfers between governments. A second extension
could study the strategic behaviours of the governments when the public
goods and inputs they provide are substitutes or complementaries. New ver-
tical and horizontal expenditures externalities would appear and diﬀerent
16equilibria might be achieved under each scenario. Thirdly, an empirical in-
vestigation would highlight how the state governments react to federal ﬁscal
decisions.
A Appendix
P r o o fo ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n4
The optimization problem of the federal government that plays Nash is
the following:
Max V (ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+B (G)
s.t. : G = knTl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+kθπ(g,τ,n). (A1)
The ﬁrst order conditions for G and T are as follows:
B
0
(G) − µ =0 (A2)
(ωτ − 1)V
0
+ µknl + µ(ωτ − 1)knTl
0
+ µkθπτ =0 , (A3)
where µ is the Lagrange’s multiplier. Similarly above, an expression with








l − (1 − θ)FLLnl
0 (A4)











l − (1 − θ)FLLnl
0 (A4)
RHS of (A4) is the MCPF of providing G by a federal government that
plays as Nash (in the case of a consumption good, the MCPF is equal to
the MCP). As both t and T are strictly positive and FLL < 0,R H So f( A 4 )
is smaller than the MCPFG
U (expression (21)).¥
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